The Ellsberg paradox concerns decision making under uncertainty. An urn is filled with 90 balls, 30 of which are red and the remaining 60 an unspecified mix of yellow and black. (None of the 60 balls may be yellow, all of the 60 balls may be yellow, or k balls may be yellow with the remaining 60-k being black.)
Consider, now, the following two gambles:
Option A | Option B | |
Gamble 1: | Win $100 if you draw red. | Win $100 if you draw black. |
Option C | Option D | |
Gamble 2: | Win $100 if you draw red or yellow. | Win $100 if you draw black or yellow. |
Most people, when presented with Gamble 1, prefer option A over option B. And again, most people, when presented with Gamble 2, prefer option D over option C. Yet this particular pattern of choice behaviour violates the Sure-Thing Principle and thus constitutes an irrational set of preferences according to the standard theory of expected utility.
One explanation for this pattern of choice behaviour is that people have an aversion to uncertainty. Although we know that option A has a 1/3rd chance of winning, and option D has a 2/3rds chance of winning, the chances attached to options B and C depend upon the composition of the urn, which is unknown. Yet even if it is true that individuals have an aversion to uncertainty, the question remains - why?
Consider the following evolutionary model: individuals are “programmed” with a type AC, AD, BC or BD. The type of an individual specifies which option they will choose if presented with either gamble 1 or gamble 2. At the start of each generation, Nature fills the urn with a randomly selected mix of yellow and black balls (selected using a uniform distribution), and decides which of gambles 1 or 2 to present to each person in the population.
Each person then draws a ball from the urn (with replacement, so that the composition of the urn does not change). If a person wins, then they have one offspring, which is of the same type as themselves and the parent continues to live. If a person does not win, they have no offspring and die. (Note that this is equivalent to having 2 offspring if you win, 0 if you lose, with everyone from the parent generation dying at the end of the current round of play. Although the second formulation is an easier way to think of the model, it is implemented in the actual program as the former.) We continue this process until the population converges to a single type, or until everyone dies off.
If we run repeated trials, what we find is that not only does the type AD tend to have the greatest fecundity (total number of offspring, tallied over all trials) but that more trials converge to AD than any of the other three types. Natural selection may select for uncertainly aversion.