At the end of this lecture, you should be able to:
In a famous book, The Construction of Social Reality, \cite{Searle:1996} explored the conditions which had to be satisfied to make social reality. Here’s the view in a nutshell:
One of the main readings for this week is taken from Ian Hacking’s book called The Social Construction of What?.
The title might lead you to ask the following question:
Since all of social reality is (obviously) the product of human choices or behaviour, and none of it is (strictly speaking) determined, why do people make a big deal of social constructivism?
Actually, do they?
What a lot of things are said to be socially constructed! Here are some construction titles from a library catalog:\citep[pg. 1]{Hacking:1999}
- Authorship
- Brotherhood
- The child viewer of television
- Danger
- Emotions
- Facts
Talk of constructing authorship makes sense, because that is obviously a social fact, in in Searle’s sense.
But what about brotherhood, danger, emotions, or facts?
Danger might make sense, as there’s a reason why we view things as dangerous or not — but how can emotions or facts be socially constructed?
Hacking: “we first need to confront the point of social construction analysis. Don’t ask for the meaning, ask what’s the point.”
The point is that social constructivism has a different focus than theories of constructing social reality.
Social constructionists about $X$ tend to hold that:
- $X$ need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. $X$, or $X$ as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable.
Very often, they go further, and urge that:
- $X$ is quite bad as it is.
\citep[pg. 6]{Hacking:1999}
- We would be much better off if $X$ were done
away with, or at least radically transformed.
Not all social constructivists assert or
To illustrate the possible variations, consider the idea of gender.
Early feminists grappled with the fact that power relations between the sexes needed reform, but sex differences seemed inevitable. The sex/gender distinction enabled :
$X$ [=gender] need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. $X$, or $X$ as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable.
Differences exist in how feminist theorists approach and
When we talk about social construction, what is it that is constructed?
Hacking reflects on the book title The Social Construction of Women Refugees, observing:
When $X$ = women refugees, propositions , and are painfully obvious. What, then, could possibly be the point of talking about the social construction of women refugees? \citep[pg. 9]{Hacking:1999}
The point is this: it is the idea which is socially constructed, in its wider supporting matrix.
The matrix in which the idea of the woman refugee is formed is a complex of institutions, advocates, newspaper articles, lawyers, court decisions, immigration proceedings[…] \citep[pg. 10]{Hacking:1999}
The idea of the “woman refugee” is a classificatory term, which sorts people into various categories.
Hacking notes:
Women in flight are the product of social conditions in their homelands. It would be stupid to talk about social construction in that context, because social circumstances so manifestly provoke the fear of staying home and the hope of succor in another land. But since, in Canada [Hacking's home country], woman refugee may seem a straightforward and rather inevitable way of classifying some people, there is indeed a point to claiming that the classification is far from inevitable. \citep[pg. 11]{Hacking:1999}
The point about women refugees generalises.
Social constructivism is important precisely when:
In the present state of affairs, $X$ is taken for granted; $X$ appears to be inevitable. \citep[pg. 12]{Hacking:1999}
Objects like money, contracts, laws, and other institutions (what Searle wrote about) are obviously socially constructed, and so there’s no need for a social constructivist analysis of them.
You do not find books on the social construction of banks, the fiscal system, cheques, money, dollar bills, bills of lading, contracts, tort, the Federal Reserve, or the British monarchy. These are all contractual or institutional objects, and no one doubts that contracts and institutions are the result of historical events and social processes. Hence no one urges that they are socially constructed. They are part of what John Searle (1995) calls social reality. His book is titled The Construction of Social Reality, and as I explained elsewhere \citep{Hacking:1997}, that is not a social construction book at all. \citep[pg. 12]{Hacking:1999}
Social constructivism targets those parts of social reality which appear inevitable and not that which could have been otherwise.
Recall the claims: $X$ is not inevitable; that $X$ is a bad thing; that the world would be a better place without $X$.
Six grades of constructionism:
A believer in natural kinds believes that:
One must, to quote a well-known metaphor, “carve nature at the joints”.
The idea is the following: suppose $P$ is the set of all properties.
Clearly we can speak of any subset $S\subseteq P$ of properties, but some subsets of properties are special. For example:
Mass of $9.109 \times 10^{-31}$kg, electronic charge of $-1.602 \times 10^{-19}$ coulomb, intrinsic angular moment of $\tfrac12$, intrinsic magnetic moment of one Bohr magneton.
Now consider the following random set of properties:
Mass of 7,000 kg (average mass of an African elephant), volume of 0.568 litres (one Imperial pint), magnetic field strength of 25 Gauss (average magnetic field strength of the Earth).
Whereas the set of properties for an electron refer to a kind of thing that naturally occurs in the world, the set of properties for Object X does not.
Hacking defines human kinds as follows:
When I speak of human kinds, I mean (i) kinds that are relevant to some of us, (ii) kinds that primarily sort people, their actions, and behaviour, and (iii) kinds that are studied in the human and social sciences, i.e., kinds about which we hope to have knowledge. I add (iv) that kinds of people are paramount; I want to include kinds of human behaviour, action, tendency, etc., only when they are projected to form the idea of a kind of person. \citep[pg. 354]{Hacking:1996}
One consequence of making certain kinds the subject of social science is that the scientific study ends up shaping and altering our understanding of the human kind:
How do human kinds differ from natural kinds?
Human kinds are kinds that people may want to be or not to be, not in order to attain some end but because human kinds have intrinsic moral value. \citep[pg. 367]{Hacking:1996}
If $N$ is a natural kind and $Z$ is $N$, it makes no direct difference to $Z$, if it is called $N$.
If $H$ is a human kind and $A$ is a person, then calling $A$ $H$ may make us treat $A$ differently, just as calling $Z$ $N$ may make us do something to $Z$ […] But it also makes a difference to $A$ to know that $A$ is an $H$, precisely because there is so often a moral connotation to a human kind. Perhaps $A$ does not want to be $H$!
Hacking notes that acquiring a new human kind can enable us to redescribe our past to such an extent that it makes it possible to experience new pasts.
For example, consider the phenomenon Miranda Fricker named hermeneutic injustice: when some groups suffer a kind of epistemic injustice because of the absence of descriptive categories which would help them understand their experiences.\nocite{Fricker:2006,Fricker:2007}
[O]ne way in which some human kinds differ from some kinds of thing is that classifying people works on people, changes them, and can even change their past. The process does not stop there. The people of a kind themselves are changed. Hence ‘we’, the experts, are forced to rethink our classifications. Moreover, causal relationships between kinds are changed. \citep[pg. 369]{Hacking:1996}
What Hacking calls the looping effect of human kinds consists of three interconnected claims:
There are many different types of human kinds.
There are many different types of human kinds.
Social constructivism and the looping effect can thus interact in important ways: